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The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade held that the abortion right is a fundament of 
the constitutional right to personal privacy.3  The Roe Court’s privacy analysis has 
been criticized by constitutional scholars from the right and left as lacking a textual 
basis in the Constitution.4  Some scholars have attempted to re-conceive the abortion 
right on equal protection terms, but the requirement of purposeful discrimination5 has 
hobbled such efforts.6  Despite the difficulties of grounding the abortion right in the 
Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, this right does have a basis in the 
text of the Constitution or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,7 a passage that was so recently revived or at least remembered in Saenz 
v. Roe.8  The Privileges or Immunities Clause, unlike the modern Equal Protection 
Clause, does not require a demonstration of purposeful discrimination9 and so this 
                                                                
3Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
4See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 
YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The 
Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. Ct. Rev. 159; Laurence Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of the 
Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1973). 
5See, e.g., Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
6See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective On Abortion 
Regulation And Questions Of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991). 
7U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1 in part that: “No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” 
8119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999). 
9See supra note 7. 
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obstacle cannot hamper the argument presented herein as it did the equal protection 
arguments.   
In this article, the Privileges or Immunities Clause will be re-conceived in its 
original context, at the center of the Fourteenth Amendment.10  This re-conception 
includes the assumption that The Slaughter-House Cases11 were decided 
incorrectly.12  The contention of the article is that abortion restrictions, as a specific 
originalist matter, can be considered economic legislation and that they also 
economically burden women,13 such that they unconstitutionally abridge two 
privileges or immunities, the Lochnerian liberties to contract and the engagement in 
any of the common occupations.  Specifically, abortion restrictions violate “the 
prohibition on redistributive ‘class’ legislation . . . that was deeply rooted in the 
original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.”14  This claim is confined to a 
reconciliation of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment with the 
Casey Court’s holding that “a State may not prohibit any woman from making the 
ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”15   
I.  A BRIEF DIAGRAM OF THE MECHANISM 
To arrive at a modern, yet specific originalist understanding of the liberty to 
contract and the liberty to engage in any of the common occupations, their existence, 
scope, importance and applicability to women must be first identified through an 
examination of the Lochner-era Supreme Court jurisprudence.  The modern 
component of the originalist understanding of privileges or immunities is added by 
examining a specific originalist conception of Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which grants Congress the power to interpret civil rights established 
prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting “appropriate 
legislation.”16  As will be contended, Congress’ interpretive power under Section 
Five is a specific originalist mechanism allowing Congress to recognize and to 
respond to changed social contexts, including economic realities for women and 
social attitudes on women.  Two such responses are the Family Medical Leave Act17 
and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.18  These two statutes will be examined for 
                                                                
10See Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1241, 1241 (1998) (asserting that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is the clause from 
which the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment expected most).  
1183 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
12See Rosen, supra note 10, at 1241 (arguing that “‘everyone,’ we’re told, now agrees that 
the Supreme Court took a wrong turn in the Slaughter-House cases in 1873, when a narrow 
majority read the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment out of the 
Constitution by construing it into irrelevancy”). 
13See Siegel, supra note 6; see also MacKinnon, supra note 6. 
14See Rosen, supra note 10, at 1248. 
15Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).  Thus, this article need not 
entertain, e.g., fetal rights. 
16U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
1729 U.S.C. § 2601 (1998). 
18Pub. L. 95-555 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1998)). 
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Congress’ understanding and treatment of women’s reproductive role in economic 
terms and how this understanding and treatment affects the constitutionality of 
abortion restrictions. 
The suggested “resurrection” of the Lochnerian civil rights will be seen not to 
vitiate the New Deal, because the “resurrection” does not require an exclusive 
economic premise of classical economics to the exclusion of the progressive 
economics of the New Deal.  Rather the argument can be seen as relying on the 
premise of the Fourteenth Amendment in its original context, a securing of “limited 
absolute equality,”19 as interpreted by Congress pursuant to Section Five.  In 
addition, the New Deal will be seen as only reducing the importance of Lochnerian 
rights, but not nullifying them, and in the process can be seen as consistent with an 
originalist view of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A.  An Originalist Interpretation of Per Se Abortion Rights 
For a textualist or an originalist, a right to be free from abortion restrictions is 
unlikely to be a privilege or immunity of federal citizenship.  Professor McConnell 
identifies two sources of privileges or immunities for a textualist or specific 
originalist20—the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, as non-
exhaustively interpreted by Corfield v. Coryell and the rights enumerated in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866,—and abortion rights are not once mentioned.21   
A non-specific originalist interpretation requires the same conclusion.  
Historically, abortion was legally permissible at common law at the opening of the 
nineteenth century if performed before quickening.22  Through the middle of the 
century and especially in the years following the Civil War, states enacted legislation 
restricting abortion, and the cumulative effect was to prohibit abortion from 
conception.23  Thus, under McConnell’s useful three-pronged test for whether a 
given right is a privilege or immunity of citizenship,24 a right to be free from abortion 
restrictions fails, as state legislatures abolished the common law right to abortion 
before quickening.  Therefore, the assumption that a per se right to be free from 
abortion restrictions is not a privilege or immunity of citizenship is sound. 
B.  The Myth That Life Begins At Conception 
Any originalist argument, if not any legal argument, against abortion restrictions 
requires a consideration of the history of abortion law to determine whether, as a 
                                                                
19See Rosen, supra note 10, at 1242; Earl Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: 
Republican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 
221, 224 (1987). 
20See Michael McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 
947, 1027-28 (1995). 
21See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.D.Pa. 1823) 
(No. 3230); the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.   
22See Siegel, supra note 6, at 281-82 (1992). 
23Id. at 282. 
24See McConnell, supra note 20, at 1028 (stating that these prongs are: nationally uniform, 
permanent and stable part of American legal legacy, and legally enforceable as a matter of 
right rather than discretionary). 
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constitutional principal, life begins at conception.  The text of the Constitution and 
the Supreme Court prior to Roe are silent on the matter.  Thus, an examination of the 
common law and American practice in the nineteenth century, an era when abortion 
law was in flux is warranted.25  Within the nineteenth century, there were two general 
phases of abortion law, and neither establishes that, as a constitutional principal, life 
begins at conception.  At most, the evidence as to when life begins is unclear.  This 
history as well as the text of the Fourteenth Amendment bar fetuses from possessing 
constitutional rights. 
1.  Phase One: The Common Law at the Opening of the Nineteenth Century 
Abortion was legally permissible at common law at the opening of the nineteenth 
century if performed before quickening, typically in the fourth or fifth month of 
pregnancy.26  Quickening was the first perception of fetal movement by the pregnant 
woman.27  As Mohr noted, the common law did not recognize the existence of a fetus 
until it had quickened, but after it had quickened, the destruction of a fetus was 
“considered a crime, because the fetus itself had manifested some semblance of a 
separate existence: the ability to move.”28  In addition, the crime of destroying a fetus 
“was qualitatively different from the destruction of a human being . . . and punished 
less harshly.”29   
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, establishing the common law in the United 
States in Commonwealth v. Bangs, held that abortions early in pregnancy were 
beyond the scope of the law, and not a crime.30  Bangs was the seminal case on 
quickening during this first general phase, and various state courts followed it.31   
2.  The Second General Phase: The Movement to Restrict Abortions 
During the middle of the nineteenth century and especially in the years following 
the Civil War, states began to enact various legislative restrictions on abortion so as 
to prohibit abortion from conception.32  Between 1860 and 1880, states and 
territories passed forty anti-abortion statutes in different forms and for various 
reasons,33 and these statutes generally abolished the common law doctrine of 
quickening.34  
                                                                
25See JAMES MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA (1978). 
26
 Siegel, supra note 6, at 281-82. 
27MOHR, supra note 25, at 3. 
28MOHR, supra note 25, at 3. 
29MOHR, supra note 25, at 3. 
309 Mass. 387 (1812). 
31See Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. 263 (1845); State v. Smith, 32 Me. Rep. 369 
(1851); Abrams v. Foshee, 3 Cole’s Ed. 274 (Iowa 1856); Smith v. Gaffard, 31 Ala. 45 (1857); 
and Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204 (1879). 
32Siegel, supra note 6, at 282. 
33See MOHR, supra note 25, at 200-25. 
34See Siegel, supra note 6, at 282. 
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In the national political movement to ban abortion, many reasons were cited to 
justify an abandonment of the old common law doctrine of quickening.  The political 
movement and subsequent transformation in abortion law “occurred at the behest of 
the nation’s physicians.”35  Doctors’ opposition to abortion was “partly ideological, 
partly scientific, partly moral, and partly practical.”36  Scientifically and morally, the 
doctors argued that human development was “continuous from the point of 
conception,” and that abortion at any stage of pregnancy was therefore an unjustified 
destruction of human life.37 Practically, the doctors were attempting to establish the 
medical profession as a profession, and, by opposing abortion, they sought to 
distinguish themselves from popular practitioners “in method and commitment” by 
opposing abortion.38 
The Ohio legislative record is representative of this national campaign against 
abortion and provides much evidence of the doctors’ role in lobbying state legislators 
for criminal abortion statutes.39  A special legislative committee submitted a proposal 
for banning abortion in Ohio along with a formal report on abortion in Ohio, which 
“clearly demonstrated the influence of the national physicians’ crusade at the state 
level.”40  The special committee attributed its understanding of abortion to the 
American Medical Association and acknowledged that its report recited many of the 
facts that were listed in the anti-abortion tract of Horatio Storer, a prominent leader 
in the anti-abortion movement and former Harvard professor of obstetrics and 
gynecology.41 
The committee’s report mentioned that abortions frequently occurred, and that 
middle class women aborted most often.42  The report also contended that abortion 
was murder, and a danger to women because abortion violated “nature’s laws.”43  
The report condemned women who resisted motherhood, and warned married 
women who were avoiding their marital obligations.44  The report’s conclusion 
indicated that the Ohio legislators were concerned about the demographic failure of 
the American family.45 
                                                                
35Id. 
36MOHR, supra note 25, at 34-35. 
37Siegel, supra note 6, at 282. 
38Siegel, supra note 6, at 283. 
39Siegel, supra note 6, at 315. 
40MOHR, supra note 25, at 206-07 (citing 1867 Ohio Senate J. App., 233-35). 
41Siegel, supra note 6, at 316 (citing Ohio Senate J. App., at 233, 235; HORATIO ROBINSON 
STORER, WHY NOT? A BOOK FOR EVERY WOMAN (1866)). 
42See MOHR, supra note 25, at 207. 
43Siegel, supra note 6, at 316 (citing 1867 Ohio Senate J. App. 234). 
44Siegel, supra note 6, at 316-17 (citing 1867 Ohio Senate J. App. 235). 
45MOHR, supra note 25, at 208. 
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Subsequently, the Ohio legislature criminalized the destruction of the fetus, and 
nullified the common law of quickening.46  The criminal statute, however, did not 
punish abortion as murder, and instead classified abortion at any stage of gestation as 
a “high misdemeanor.”47  Thus, as Professor Siegel argued, the Ohio criminal 
abortion statute “was enacted out of a confluence of concerns, reflecting an interest 
in enforcing women’s adherence to marital roles, in preserving the hegemony of [the 
middle class,] and in protecting unborn life.”48  To add to this confluence, the Ohio 
law was also pro-physician special interest legislation, enacted against the wishes of 
the people of Ohio.49   
Not only did this confluence of reasons motivate the Ohio legislature aside from 
protecting the unborn, but not even in the legislature’s desire to protect the unborn 
did it premise that life begins at conception.  Protecting unborn life is not 
synonymous with the proposition that life begins at conception, as reflected in the 
Ohio legislature’s failure to classify abortion as murder.  Similarly, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Slagle held that “it is not the murder of a living 
child that constitutes the offense, but the destruction of gestation by wicked means 
and against nature,”50 a result that was affirmed by the North Carolina legislature in 
1881.51  Thus, states may have nullified the common law doctrine of quickening as a 
legal mechanism to permit abortions, but the nullification was not so extensive so as 
to establish that life begins at conception.   
In addition, the flux in abortion law itself bars establishment of a principal or 
tenet of American social context that life begins at conception.  Abortion restrictions 
were not hoary laws with hoary premises and underpinnings; they were the product 
of a national political movement without precedent in the history of abortion law.  If 
McConnell’s three-prong test is adapted to determine if a principal of social context 
can affect a constitutional interpretation of a privilege or immunity, the post-Civil 
War movement fails to justify a constitutional principal that life begins at 
conception.52  Abortion restrictions and their underlying premises were not uniform, 
were varied from state to state, were not a permanent and stable part of the American 
legal legacy, and were necessarily subject to the vicissitudes of legislative policy. 
II.  THERE ARE NO CONSTITUTIONAL FETAL RIGHTS 
Textually, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects only citizens of the United States.53  To be a citizen of the United States, 
persons must be “born or naturalized in the United States,” a requirement that a fetus 
                                                                
46Siegel, supra note 6, at 315 n. 223 (citing Act of Apr. 13, 1867, Ohio Laws 135-136, 
repealed by Amended Substitute House Bill No. 511, 1972 Ohio Laws 2032 (Vol. 134)). 
47Siegel, supra note 6, at 317 (citing Act of Apr. 13, 1867, Ohio Laws 135-136). 
48Id. 
49See 1867 OHIO SENATE J. APP. 233-35 (acknowledging that public opinion tolerated 
abortion and the common law doctrine of quickening and deriding quackery). 
5082 N.C. 653 (1880). 
51MOHR, supra note 25, at 227 (citing North Carolina Session Laws 1881). 
52See McConnell, supra note 20, at 1028. 
53See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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cannot satisfy.54  The Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause extend 
protection to “any person.”55  The Court in Roe v. Wade, after examining the 
prevailing abortion practices in the nineteenth century and reviewing all references to 
“person” in the Constitution, found as a textual and historical matter that “person,” as 
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.56  Therefore, and 
consistent with the common law doctrine of quickening and the intent and purposes 
of abortion restrictions as discussed above, fetuses are not entitled to constitutional 
protection. 
As a result, an examination of whether abortion restrictions violate the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause need not examine the principal that life begins at conception, 
as, at minimum, it was never established, and, more likely, was never truly accepted.  
Indeed, one could plausibly argue that abortion restrictions, in redistributing money 
to the American Medical Association and away from “quacks,” were 
unconstitutional class legislation in the nineteenth century. Moreover, a woman’s 
liberty to contract and liberty to engage in the common occupations do not compete 
with a fetus’s rights, as the latter are non-existent. 
III.  THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT57 ENCOMPASSES WOMEN 
Textually, Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment does not distinguish 
between men and women, instead referring to a “person,” “persons,” and 
“citizens.”58  This textual understanding forecloses a contrary specific originalist 
understanding that limits the Amendment’s applicability to men.59 
A.  Originalism and the Theoretical Liberty to Contract 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 “encompassed the principal civil rights directly 
contemplated by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.”60  Among these civil 
                                                                
54Id. 
55Id. 
56Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973). 
57U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides that 
[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
58See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  See also Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the 
Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 467 (1995) (arguing that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was textually designed to give all persons certain civil rights, but not political 
rights). 
59But see Amar, supra note 58, at 469 (arguing contrary to Farnsworth’s view that women 
are in some ways at the center of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
60McConnell, supra note 20, at 1027. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/4
1999] ABORTION RIGHT 169 
rights designated by the 1866 Act was the liberty to contract61. . . .  While the 
existence of the liberty to contract is not disputed,62 the actual scope of the liberty is 
a matter of debate, and thus an examination of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the liberty to contract is necessary. 
In Barbier v. Connolly,63 the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the original 
intent of the liberty to contract and in so doing displayed hostility to class 
legislation.64  The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment “undoubtedly 
intended” that “no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of any one, 
except as applied to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances; that no 
greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the same calling 
and condition.”65  The Barbier Court also recognized that the liberty to contract is 
not unlimited, because the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere with 
the power of the state “to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, 
education and good order of the people.”66 
Holden v. Hardy67 was the Court’s first examination of the liberty to contract 
with respect to labor legislation.  The Holden Court assessed for its constitutionality 
a Utah statutory provision that placed a ceiling on the number of hours men may 
work each day in underground mines.68  The Court sustained the statutory provision, 
holding that it did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis that the Utah 
legislature reasonably found the occupation of mining to be “detrimental to the 
health of the employees.”69  The Court carefully distinguished the Utah statute from 
a general maximum hours statute, observing that the statute “does not profess to limit 
the hours of all workmen, but merely those who are employed in underground mines, 
or in the smelting, reduction, or refining of ores or metals.”70  Thus, the Holden 
                                                                
61The Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1 provides in pertinent part that “[a]ll persons within the 
jurisdiction of United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and 
enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens. 
62See Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged; Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 
YALE L.J. 454 (1909). 
63113 U.S. 27 (1884). 
64See Gillman, supra note 62, at 201 (arguing that long-standing features of nineteenth 
century police powers jurisprudence are “an emphasis on market liberty, the belief that market 
liberty could be interfered with if legislation promoted a valid public purpose, and the 
suggestion that valid public-purpose legislation was distinct from laws that merely promoted 
the interests of some classes at the expense of others”). 
65113 U.S. at 31. 
66Id.  See also Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (holding that for the State 
justifiably to interpose its authority, “it must appear--First that the interests of the public 
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, 
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and 
not unduly oppressive upon individuals”). 
67Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
68Id. at 380. 
69Id. at 395. 
70Id. 
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Court’s justificatory basis for the Utah statute or, more broadly, the scope of a state’s 
proper exercise of its police powers, is predicated on the dangerousness of a given 
occupation.71  The Court additionally evinced a scepticism as to the constitutionality 
of a general maximum hours statute, where such dangerousness is unlikely to be 
reasonably found, a scepticism that was later confirmed in Lochner v. New York.72 
The Court acknowledged the Utah legislature’s finding that the owners of mines 
and their employees “do not stand upon an equality, and that their interests are, to a 
certain extent, conflicting.”73  Nevertheless the Court held that a disparity of 
bargaining power does not by itself justify a state’s interference with market 
relations, but that a disparity entailing a neglect of laborers’ health and safety, would 
be sufficient justification.74  The Court’s approach in Holden indicates that a state’s 
interference on behalf of exploited workers is consistent with its general police 
powers.75  The Court’s position in Holden may be regarded as a restriction on an 
employee’s liberty to contract, but only insofar as the employee, laboring in an 
inherently hazardous occupation like mining, is “protected against himself,”76 a 
setting where a state’s interest in the general welfare of its citizens is implicated and 
competes with the individual’s Fourteenth Amendment civil rights.  
Holden stands for the proposition that “police powers could be used not only to 
promote the general well-being of the community but also the specific well-being of 
a class of workers who were not in a position to make contracts favorable to their 
health and safety.”77  This latter instance, an expansion of the police powers which 
describes the position of the miners in Holden and which appeared to the Holden 
Court as anomalous, “is now disclosed to be of far wider and deeper application” in 
light of industrialization.78 
IV.  THE COMMON OCCUPATIONS OF LIFE 
Another privilege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is the 
right to follow any of the common occupations.  Justice Bradley reported that “[t]he 
right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an inalienable right, it was 
formulated as such under the phrase ‘pursuit of happiness’ in the declaration of 
                                                                
71See Gillman, supra note 62 at 122-25. 
72198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a maximum hours law for bakers as violative of the 
Fourteenth Amendment on the bases that the act abridged the liberty to contract and that the 
state intervention was not authorized, because baking is not an unhealthy occupation). 
73Holden, 169 U.S. at 397. 
74See id.  See also HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 123 (clarifying this 
point in light of what Gillman views as Justice Brown’s ambiguous drafting of the opinion). 
75See id. (emphasizing that “[t]he whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and 
when the individual health, safety, and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must 
suffer”). 
76Id. 
77Gillman, supra note 62, at 125 (citing Fowler Vincent Harper, Due Process of Law in 
State Labor Legislation, 26 MICH. L. REV. 599, 620-21 (1928)). 
78See Gillman, supra note 62, at 142 (citing Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 431-33 
(1917) (Felix Frankfurter et al, for defendants in error)). 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/4
1999] ABORTION RIGHT 171 
independence.”79  Justice Bradley, expressing his dissatisfaction with the Court’s 
evisceration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause80 in the Slaughter-House Cases81 
and approval of Corfield v. Coryell,82 again asserted that this right is “one of the 
privileges of a citizen of the United States.”83  The Supreme Court later expressly 
adopted Justice Bradley’s view that the right to follow any of the common 
occupations is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.84 
The Court most famously invoked this right in Yick Wo v. Hopkins where it ruled 
that the disparate administration of a municipal licensing ordinance violated the 
Equal Protection Clause on the basis that “[n]o reason whatever, except the will of 
the supervisors, is assigned why [200 Chinese] should not be permitted to carry on, 
in the accustomed manner, their harmless and useful occupation, on which they 
depend for a livelihood.”85  Similarly, the Court in Truax v. Raich held that an 
Arizona statute requiring eighty percent of every employer’s laborers to be qualified 
electors or native-born citizens violated the right to follow any of the common 
occupations of life and constituted a denial of equal protection, because “[n]o special 
public interest with respect to any particular business is shown that could possibly be 
deemed to support the enactment.”86  As a proof construct, Truax alluded to a 
disparate impact standard, inasmuch as “[t]he purpose of an act must be found its 
natural operation and effect.”87 
                                                                
79Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-
Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring).  
See id. (where Justice Bradley described this right as “a large ingredient in the civil liberty of 
the citizen”). 
80See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
8183 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
826 F.Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). 
83Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 764 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
84165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897).  See also Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 595 (1917). 
85118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).  The Yick Wo Court’s use of “will of the supervisors” must 
not be confused with the modern intentional discrimination standard, but rather as a 
proscription against “the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.”  See id. at 
370.  See also Richard Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court, 1873-1903, 
29 BUFF. L. REV. 667, 695-96 (1980) (arguing that the Yick Wo Court’s standard was “not the 
presence of race but the absence of justification”). 
86239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915).  In justifying its invocation of the right to follow the common 
occupations, the Truax Court cited, inter alia, Justice Bradley’s concurrence in Butchers’ 
Union, Allgeyer, and Yick Wo.  See Truax, 239 U.S. at 41.  See also Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 
271 U.S. 500, 527-28 (1926) (invalidating the Philippine legislature’s Chinese Bookkeeping 
Act, which forbid the keeping of accounting records in any language other than Spanish, 
English, or a local dialect, violated the right to follow any of the common occupations, as 
applied to Chinese merchants of the Philippines and citing Truax). 
87239 U.S. at 40 (citing Henderson v. New York, 92 U.S. 259, 268 (1875) and Bailey v. 
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244 (1911)). 
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V.  WOMEN’S LIBERTY TO CONTRACT 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that women’s liberty to contract is 
theoretically equal to that of men.88  Notwithstanding this formal equality, the 
Supreme Court determined that when women’s physiological differences are 
implicated, men and women are not “under like circumstances”89 such that they may 
be treated differently, but not disadvantageously, while retaining the semblance of 
formal equality.90 
Two cases that discuss the scope of a woman’s liberty to contract are Muller v. 
Oregon91 and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.92 
The Court in Muller v. Oregon93 considered whether an Oregon statute providing 
that “no female (shall) be employed in any mechanical establishment, or factory, or 
laundry in this state more than ten hours during any one day”94 violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment.95  Despite women’s formal equality in the liberty to 
contract,96 the Court reviewed the statute, which facially abridged the liberty to 
contract, by examining the liberty to contract and, hence, the state’s interest largely 
in physiological terms.97  The Muller Court brandished a sympathy for the 
“widespread belief that woman’s physical structure, and the functions she performs 
in consequence thereof, justify special legislation restricting or qualifying the 
conditions under which she should be permitted to toil.”98  Consistent with this 
belief, the Court emphasized the disadvantageousness of women’s “physical 
structure and the performance of maternal functions in . . . the struggle for 
subsistence,” especially when fulfilling the maternal role.99  The Court also 
acknowledged that women were deprived of educational and economic 
opportunities100 such that an economic disparity existed between men and women.101  
From these physiological-sociological pronouncements,102 the Court concluded that 
                                                                
88See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 418 (1908) (holding that with respect to the liberty 
to contract, women “stand on the same plane as the other sex”); Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 
261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923) (holding that “it cannot except the doctrine that women of mature 
age, sui juris, require or may be subjected to restrictions upon their liberty to contract which 
could not be lawfully imposed in the case of men under similar circumstances”). 
89See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884). 
90208 U.S. at 421-22. 
91Id. at 412. 
92261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
93208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
94Id. at 416 (parentheses in original). 
95Id. at 417.  
96Id. at 418. 
97See Siegel, supra note 6, at 266 (noting that the Muller Court used physiological 
reasoning to justify the protective maximum hours law). 
98Muller, 208 U.S. at 420-21. 
99Id. at 421. 
100Id. at 421-22. 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/4
1999] ABORTION RIGHT 173 
[t]hough limitations upon . . . contractual rights may be removed by 
legislation, there is that in her disposition and habits of life which will 
operate against a full assertion of those rights.  She will still be where 
some legislation to protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of 
right.103 
The Court accordingly held that women are “properly placed” in their own class such 
that “legislation designed for her may be sustained, even when like legislation is not 
necessary for men, and could not be sustained.”104 
The Court held that the statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 
notwithstanding its restriction of women’s liberty to contract, because the statute 
protected women from “the greed as well as the passion of man”105 and protected 
“her physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions.”106  
Additionally, the Court construed the statute as in the general interest, because of the 
necessity of women’s “vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race.”107 
In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, the Court addressed the question of whether a 
general minimum wages law for women in the District of Columbia 
unconstitutionally abridged the liberty to contract.108  The Court again emphasized 
that women possess a liberty to contract theoretically equal to that of men.109  The 
Court also re-affirmed its observation in Muller that women are physiologically 
unequal, and that “the physical differences must be recognized in appropriate cases, 
and legislation fixing hours or conditions of work may properly take them into 
account.”110  Nevertheless, the Adkins Court ruled that the minimum wages law did 
                                                          
101Id. at 422. 
102See also id. at 421 (demonstrating a notably egregious form of misogyny in noting that 
men established control over women “at the outset” through “superior physical strength” such 
that “woman has always been dependent upon man,” a misogyny that is not central to the 
Court’s legal analysis, despite animating the opinion).  As will be discussed infra, this brand 
of paternalism or misogyny loses constitutional significance after the ratification of the 
Nineteenth Amendment. 
103Muller, 208 U.S. at 422. 
104Id. at 422.  Thus for the Oregon hours law, women and men are not “under like 
circumstances.”  See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884). 
105Muller, 208 U.S. at 422. 
106Id. at 422. 
107Id. at 422. 
108Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923) (addressing the question under 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as Congress enacted the District of Columbia 
statute). 
109Id. at 553. 
110Id.  The Court also stated without explanation that non-physical inequality between 
women and men has “continued with diminishing intensity” after the ratification of the 
Nineteenth Amendment.  Id.  Aside from the issue of political rights, the Court’s statement is 
unclear in light of continued economic inequality between women and men. 
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not implicate and could not rely upon women’s physiological differences.111  The 
Adkins Court invalidated the minimum wages law, on the ground that it was 
unlawful class legislation, i.e., it was “simply and exclusively a price-fixing law, 
confined to adult women” who retain the same legal right to contract as men.112 
VI.  THE “GRAVITATIONAL FORCE” OF THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT113 
The ratification on the Nineteenth Amendment modified the understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Lawrence Lessig argues that “often the effect of an 
amendment is indirect, felt beyond the text it modifies, imposing, in Dworkin’s 
sense, a ‘gravitational force’ on other parts of the text read.”114  Along these lines, 
Akhil Amar argues that the Nineteenth Amendment indirectly affects a reading of 
the Fourteenth Amendment inasmuch as the Nineteenth Amendment “can be 
understood as establishing a kind of a fortiori argument: if women have equal 
political rights, a fortiori they should have equal civil rights.”115 
Professor Amar’s view is the same as that of the Adkins Court.116  Adkins held 
“the ancient inequality of the sexes, otherwise than physical, as suggested in the 
Muller Case . . . has continued ‘with diminished intensity.’”117 The Court added that  
“[i]n view of the great—not to say revolutionary—changes which have 
taken place . . .  in the contractual, political, and civil status of women, 
culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment, it is not unreasonable to say 
that these difference have now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing 
point.” 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as indirectly modified by the Nineteenth 
Amendment, then proscribes from judicial or legislative consideration differences in 
the social expectations of women, but must recognize in accordance with Muller 
                                                                
111See id. at 550 (holding that the state does not invariably maintain an interest in its 
population’s strength and robustness so as to vindicate any law on the basis of being a health 
law, because noting that “[s]carcely any law but might find shelter under such assumptions, 
and conduct, properly so called, as well as contract, would come under the restrictive sway of 
the Legislature). 
112Adkins, 261 U.S. at 554. 
113U.S. CONST. amend. XIX provides that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” 
114See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 395, 407 (1995) (citing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 111 
(1978)). 
115See Amar, supra note 58, at 471.  Cf. Akhil Amar, The Case of the Missing 
Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992) (criticizing the R.A.V. 
Court’s opinions for failing to consider the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on the First 
Amendment in examining a municipal hate speech ordinance); Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1241, 1248 (1998) (arguing that the 
Sixteenth Amendment provides a textual basis for discarding anti-redistributivism as a 
constitutional principle). 
116See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553; Amar, supra note 58, at 471. 
117Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553. 
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“physical differences . . . in appropriate cases.”118  An example of a judicial opinion 
that is rendered nugatory by Adkins is Justice Bradley’s statement in Bradwell v. 
Illinois119 that “[m]an is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural 
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it 
for many of the occupations of civil life.”120  Such social considerations are 
impermissible after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. 
VII.  THE SOCIAL CONTEXT UNDERLYING MULLER121 
In examining women’s physiology, the Lochner-era Court determined that 
women and men are not “under like circumstances.”122  The primary physiological 
difference is women’s performance of maternal functions.123  The Court recognized 
that the performance of maternal functions places women “at a disadvantage in the 
struggle for subsistence,” particularly “when the burdens of motherhood are upon 
her.”124  The Court justified protective legislation for women on the basis of these 
physiological assumptions.125  
A.  Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment: An Interpretive Mechanism 
When Congress enacts “appropriate legislation”126 pursuant to Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress exercises its powers under a specific originalist 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to create substantive rights or 
circumvent the amendment process of Article Five, but to interpret or to fashion the 
Amendment.127  
                                                                
118Id. 
11983 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
120Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J. concurring).  See also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 
412, 422 (1908) (whose social statement that “[i]t is impossible to close one’s eyes to the fact 
that she still looks to her brother and depends upon him” would also appear to be rendered 
nugatory by Adkins). 
121
“Social context” will be defined infra, in the section on methodology.  The term refers 
to economic realities and social attitudes prevalent in American society and the Supreme 
Court’s and Congress’ treatment and understanding of them. 
122Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884). 
123See Muller, 208 U.S. at 421-22 (noting that other differences include “the amount of 
physical strength” and “the capacity for long continued labor”). 
124Id. at 421. 
125See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).  See also Siegel, supra note 6, at 266 
(arguing that the “physiological argument” played an important role in justifying the 
protective legislation upheld in Muller v. Oregon). 
126U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5. 
127See Michael McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretations: A Critique of City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 173-74 (1997) (arguing that to conclude that 
interpretation is indistinguishable from amendment is to descend into postmodern 
deconstructionism). 
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B.  Congress’ Section Five Powers Are Textually Unclear 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from making or 
enforcing laws that “abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.”128 Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “The Congress shall 
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the article.”129  
The nature and scope of Congress’ powers under the Enforcement Clause are 
textually unclear,130 and so an examination of the original understanding becomes 
necessary. 
C.  The Original Understanding of Congress’ Powers under Section Five: The 
Framers’ Debates 
In February, 1866, Representative John Bingham proposed a version of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction which provided 
that Congress  
“shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to 
secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal 
protection in he rights of life, liberty, and property.”131 
Bingham’s draft encountered immediate opposition on the basis that the draft 
authorized Congress “to intrude into traditional areas of state responsibility, a power 
inconsistent with federal design.”132  In April, 1866, Bingham submitted a revised 
draft, providing that: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
.... 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of the Article.133 
                                                                
128U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
129U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
130See McConnell, supra note 127, at 170 (arguing that substantive, remedial, and 
interpretive powers are the three logical interpretations of the text of Section Five that “stand 
out”).  But see, Saikrishna Prakash, A Comment on Congressional Enforcement, 32 IND. L. 
REV. 193 (1998) (arguing that Congress’ enforcement powers are textually limited to the 
authority to enact penalties for Fourteenth Amendment violations and to create federal 
institutions to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).  
131CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866). 
132City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 521 (1997) (citing the statements of 
Representatives Hale and Hotchkiss, and Senator Stewart at CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1063-65, 1082, 1095 (1866)). 
133CONG. GLOBE 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2286 (1866), cited in McConnell, supra note 127, at 
177 n. 148. 
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This draft, after other revisions that are not pertinent here, was ratified in July, 1868 
as the Fourteenth Amendment.134 
In comparing the February and April drafts, the change of breaking the concept 
of “equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property” into two clauses,135 a 
prohibition of the denial of “equal protection of the laws” and a prohibition against 
depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” was 
critical “to relieving the concerns expressed by moderate Republicans about the 
February proposal.”136  While Bingham insisted that the February proposal “meant 
only that Congress could protect preexisting rights,”137 McConnell noted that “many 
members of Congress, including Republicans, feared that it would invest Congress 
with the power to pass legislation directly regarding life, liberty, and property.”138  
This criticism was “directed exclusively” to the equal protection provision of the 
February proposal.139  Thus, the April proposal stripped Congress of “any power it 
might have under the February draft to provide direct protection of life, liberty, and 
property,”140 and Congress’s power to enforce preexisting constitutional rights, such 
as the liberty to contract,141 “was not affected by this change.”142  The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s history indicates that Congressional power was limited to an 
enforcement of rights established by the Amendment itself, which “was an important 
protection for the states, because it ensured that neither Congress nor the Courts 
could go beyond the rights enshrined in the Constitution itself.”143 
                                                                
134See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 523. 
135McConnell, supra note 127, at 179 n. 159. 
136McConnell, supra note 127, at 179 n. 159 (citing EARL MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 56-60, 100-01 (1990). 
137McConnell, supra note 127, at 179 n. 159 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
157-58, 1089-90 (1866)). 
138McConnell, supra note 127, at 179 n. 159. 
139Cong. Globe 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hale), cited in 
McConnell, supra note 127, at 180.  See Cong. Globe 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866) 
(statement of Rep. Hale); Cong. Globe 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (statement of Rep. 
Hotchkiss) (1866) (Hale and Hotchkiss both expressly stated that their criticism did not apply 
to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the expected vehicle for the incorporation of the liberty 
to contract). 
140McConnell, supra note 127, at 180. 
141See Gillman, supra note 62, at 27-28 (observing that the liberty to contract is rooted in 
the common law and that Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson subscribed to the theory 
that government ought to promote and protect the market rather than intrude “into the conflicts 
that were a natural feature of the opportunities it had to offer”); McConnell, supra note 127, at 
180 (arguing that the “Privileges or Immunities Clause was unobjectionable because it referred 
to a fixed set of rights defined by some combination of the Bill of Rights and longstanding 
practice (usually common law”)). 
142Id. 
143Id at 181 (arguing that Congress could not establish, for example, ordinary tort or 
contract laws under the guise of equal protection). 
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Additionally, the original understanding of Section Five was animated by the 
concern that the Supreme Court would undermine Reconstruction by narrowly 
interpreting congressional power.144  Republicans, who drafted and adopted the 
Fourteenth Amendment, were not enthralled with the Supreme Court, which ten 
years prior to the ratification of the Amendment pronounced its decision in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford.145  John Bingham “goaded his fellow members of Congress to vote 
for the proposal by reminding them of the ‘horrid blasphemy’ of Dred Scott.”146  
Republican Senator Oliver Morton explained that “the remedy for the violation of 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments was expressly not left to the courts. The 
remedy was legislative, because in each the amendment itself provided that it shall 
be enforced by legislation on part of Congress.”147  Therefore, Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment intended that Congress is obliged and authorized to interpret 
the preexisting constitutional rights.148 
D.  A Few Methodological Points 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional 
mechanism for Congress to interpret civil rights protected by the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause149 and enact “appropriate legislation”150 or legislative remedies to 
prevent abridgments of civil rights.151  In providing a legislative remedy, Congress 
necessarily evaluates and reacts to social context, e.g., economic realities and social 
attitudes.  To argue to the contrary is to subscribe to the absurd view that Congress 
provides legislative remedies to constitutional violations arbitrarily, in a vacuum and 
without reference to the Constitution or to realities of American life.  As the 
mechanism by which Congress evaluates and recognizes economic realities and 
social attitudes and treats these realities and attitudes, i.e., Section Five, is of a 
constitutionally interpretive nature, recognized and treated realities and attitudes are 
constitutionally significant insofar as they modify or extend prior social context 
affecting interpretation of civil rights.152 
                                                                
144Id. at 182. 
14560 U.S. 393 (1856). 
146McConnell, supra note 127, at 182 (citing Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 483 
(1868)). 
147Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (1872). 
148McConnell, supra note 127, at 183.  See also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-12 
(holding that legislation enacted pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment “must 
necessarily be predicated upon supposed state laws or state proceedings, and be directed to the 
correction of their operation and effect”). 
149McConnell, supra note 127, at 176. 
150U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
151McConnell, supra note 127, at 183. 
152Congress’ recognition and treatment of these realities and attitudes as well as the 
realities and attitudes themselves, once recognized, have, in Dworkin’s sense, “gravitational 
force” upon the pre-existing social context accompanying the privileges or immunities, and 
thus, indirectly, the interpretation of the privileges or immunities.  See RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 111 (1978). 
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Section Five is thus a specific originalist mechanism for translation in that it 
permits Congress to account for foreground and background changes in American 
life, a principal tenet of translation theory.153  Essentially, this article is an attempt to 
account for such changes and Congress’ treatment and understanding of these 
changes through an examination of legislation enacted pursuant to Section Five.154  
In a sense, this method of translation is a variation of Professor Lessig’s concept of 
synthesis as a mechanism of translation,155 the only difference being that Section 
Five legislation imposes the gravitational force rather than constitutional 
amendment.  
VIII.  THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF MULLER AND THE “NEW” SOCIAL CONTEXT: SECTION 
FIVE LEGISLATION AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ABORTION RESTRICTIONS 
The enactments of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (PDA) constitute an extended social context from the social 
context in Muller and Adkins.  This extension is emblematic of a revolutionary 
change in women’s role in the labor force and a new congressional understanding of 
the economic consequences on women’s reproductive role.  
A.  The Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
Congress, in providing in the PDA that “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” 
includes “because of or on the basis of pregnancy,”156 concurred with the Muller 
Court’s premise that women’s primary physiological difference is the performance 
of maternal functions.157  Congress thus determined that the notion of pregnancy is 
subsumed into the notion of sex.158  Moreover, as the Education and Labor 
Committee noted, the PDA “unmistakably reaffirms that sex discrimination includes 
discrimination based on pregnancy.”159 
The PDA is also evidence of Congress’ evincement of an understanding that 
pregnancy adversely affects the economic lives of women.  The House Report 
accompanying the PDA and compiled by the Education and Labor Committee, 
explained that “the assumption that women will become pregnant and leave the labor 
force leads to the view of women as marginal workers, and is at the root of the 
                                                                
153See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995). 
154In this article, these changes and the Congressional understanding accompanying them 
will be termed “social context.” 
155Lessig, supra note 153, at 407 (arguing that “often the effect of an amendment is 
indirect, felt beyond the text it modifies, imposing . . . a ‘gravitational force’ on other parts of 
the text read. This is the effect tracked by the changed reading I call synthesis”). 
156Pub. L. 95-5, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
157Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 421 (1908). 
158H.R Rep. 95-948, 95th Cong. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750 
(stating that “it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female 
from the male.”) 
159H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4744, 4751. 
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discriminatory practices which keep women in low-paying and deadend jobs.”160  
This understanding is emblematic of a continuity with the social context in Muller 
that women’s reproductive role places women “at a disadvantage in the struggle for 
subsistence,” especially when the “burdens of motherhood are upon her.”161 
The PDA, as Section Five legislation and thus interpretive for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes, subsumed the notion of pregnancy into the notion of a 
woman.  Thus, Congress, in enacting the PDA, nullified the distinction in Geduldig 
v. Aiello162 between pregnant and nonpregnant women.163  
B.  The Family And Medical Leave Act 
The principal congressional recognition in the FMLA is that “due to the nature of 
the roles of men and women in our society, the primary responsibility of family 
caretaking often falls on women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of 
women more than it affects the working lives of men.”164  In addition, Congress 
recognized the recent, but revolutionary trend that the number of single-parent 
households and two-parent households in which the single parent or both parents 
work is increasing significantly.165 
                                                                
160H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4744, 4751. 
161Muller, 208 U.S. at 421. 
162417 U.S. 484 (1974) (ruling that the State of California’s exclusion of pregnancy 
benefits from its insurance program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).  In the 
following section, the proof construct of Geduldig will be addressed extensively. 
163Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (basing this distinction on the contention that 
nonpregnant persons include members of both sexes, while pregnant persons are exclusively 
women).  See Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and 
Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989, 1042 n.205 (1991) (asserting that Congress 
reversed Geduldig by enacting the PDA). 
16429 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5).  See also S. REP. No. 103-3, 103d Cong. (1993), reprinted in 
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 10, stating that 
 
Many new parents have no guarantee that their jobs will be protected either when they 
are unable to work due to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, or after 
childbirth or placement for adoption . . . when they need to stay home to care for their 
infants . . . .  A television anchor from Portland, OR told the subcommittee of being 
forced to choose between her job and her newborn child.  Ms. Rebecca Webb initially 
had an agreement with her employer for a 3-month leave after childbirth.  However, 7 
months into her pregnancy, the leave previously granted was rescinded.  The company 
claimed that they did not want to set a precedent for maternity leave because there 
were four other pregnant women working at the time.  With the maternity leave no 
longer available, Ms. Webb was forced to quit her job. 
16529 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1) (1993).  See also S. REP. No. 103-3 (1993), reprinted in 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 10, stating that 
 
The General Accounting Office reports that, over the past 40 years, the female civilian 
labor force has increased by about a million workers each year.  By 1990, nearly 57 
million women were working or looking for work-more than a 200 percent increase 
since 1950 . . .  Today, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics . . . [t]he 
participation of women in the workforce was 19 percent in 1900; today 74 percent of 
women aged 25-54 are in the labor force . . .  The Census Bureau reports that single 
parents accounted for 27 percent of all family groups with children under 18 years old 
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Thus, the Labor and Human Resources Committee found in its Senate Report that 
‘“mothers’ employment is often critical in keeping their families above the poverty 
line.”166  A continuity therefore exists between the Muller Court’s statement about 
women’s “struggle for subsistence” and Congress’ understanding that women’s 
reproductive role is economically disadvantageous.167  The only change is that the 
disadvantage is much greater today in light of women’s increasingly critical 
economic role. 
IX.  THE TRANSLATION IS STRICTLY OF SOCIAL CONTEXT 
The legal framework guiding the jurisprudence of the liberty to contract and the 
liberty to engage in any of the common occupations is not modified or translated 
despite the changed social context.  Thus when women and men are “under like 
circumstances,”168 the state may still not abridge women’s liberty to contract when 
the same restriction could not be constitutionally extended to men.169  When women 
and men are not under like circumstances, legislation exclusive to women may still 
be sustained in order “to secure a real equality of right.”170  Thus, while the legal 
frameworks of Muller and Adkins remain intact, the PDA and the FMLA expand the 
realm of the economic analysis of women’s reproductive role. 
X.  ABORTION RESTRICTIONS VIOLATE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Under either the Adkins framework or the Muller framework, and as a 
consequence of the extended social understanding, abortion restrictions are unlawful 
class legislation, violative of the liberty to contract.  And for similar reasons, 
abortion restrictions violate the right to follow any of the common occupations.171 
A.  The Muller Framework  
The Muller Court determined that when women are economically burdened by 
their reproductive role, women are not capable of fully asserting their liberty to 
                                                          
in 1988, more than twice the 1970 proportion.  Divorce, separation, and out-of-
wedlock births have left millions of women to struggle as single heads of households 
to support themselves and their children.  These women often cannot keep their 
families above poverty line.  In 1987, 20 percent of all children under age 6 lived with 
single mothers.  The poverty rate among these young children was 61.4 percent, more 
than five times the poverty rate of 11.6 percent among children living in two-parent 
families. 
166See S. REP. No. 103-3 (1993), 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8. 
167In addition, the FMLA may be treated as analogous to the Oregon maximum hours law 
for women at issue in Muller.  Both statutes are remedial and maximum hours laws, which 
serve to protect women’s reproductive capacity and economic well-being. 
168Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884). 
169See Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
170Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908). To reiterate, this form of legislation, 
typified by its protective effect, allows women to be treated equally, despite not being under 
like circumstances. 
171See, e.g., Butchers’ Union v. Crescent City, 111 U.S. 746, 762 (Bradley, J., concurring) 
(describing this right).  
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contract, and thus are not under like circumstances with men.172  The Court held that 
despite women’s formal equality under the Fourteenth Amendment,173 “[s]he will 
still be where some legislation to protect her seems necessary to secure a real 
equality of right” and hence protective legislation for women may be sustained, even 
when identical legislation for men would be unnecessary and unsustainable.174 
As a matter of social context, Congress recognized in enacting the FMLA that 
women’s maternal role constitutes an economic burden, and that this burden is a 
result of the societal roles of men and women.175  In addition, Congress recognized in 
its enactment of the PDA that the concept of a woman incorporates the concept of 
pregnancy, because women’s reproductive capacity is the primary difference 
between men and women.176  Accordingly, the notion of an abortion may not be 
conceptually separated or removed from the notion of a pregnancy.177  In addition, as 
abortion affects only women, just as pregnancy affects only women, abortion cannot 
be removed from the notion of a woman that appears in the PDA.  Therefore, the 
constitutional notion of a woman, as appearing in Muller and the PDA, incorporates 
the notion of abortion. 
Abortion restrictions have adverse economic consequences on women.  Reva 
Siegel argues that “state action compelling motherhood injures women in predictable 
ways.”178  She asserts that 
Both the work of childbearing and the work of childrearing compromise 
women’s opportunities in education and employment; neither the work of 
childbearing nor the work of childrearing produces any material 
compensation for women; most often the work of childbearing and the 
work of childrearing entangle women in relations of emotional and 
economic dependency—to men, extended family, or the state.179 
                                                                
172Muller, 208 U.S. at 422. 
173Id. at 418. 
174Id. at 422. 
175See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (1993) (stating that “due to the nature of the roles of men 
and women in our society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on 
women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of women more than it affects the 
working lives of men.”)  See also Muller, 208 U.S. at 421 (recognizing that “women’s 
physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the 
struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are 
upon her.”) 
17642 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (treating sex discrimination as inclusive of pregnancy 
discrimination); H.R. REP. 95-948 (“it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily 
differentiates the female from the male.”).  See also Muller, 208 U.S. at 420-22 (holding that 
women and men are not under like circumstances, because of the performance of maternal 
functions). 
177See, e.g., WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 4 (1998) defining “abortion” as:  “(1) the 
removal of an embryo or fetus in order to end a pregnancy, (2) any of various procedures for 
terminating a pregnancy.”  
178Siegel, supra note 6, at 377. 
179Id. at 377-78. 
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Catharine MacKinnon observes, identically to the social context established in the 
FMLA, that “[a]fter childbirth, women tend to be the ones who are primarily 
responsible for the intimate care of offspring—their own and those of others.”180  She 
additionally argues that when “there is not enough money for another child or for an 
abortion, it is a woman who is forced to have a child she cannot responsibly care for. 
When a single parent is impoverished as a result of childbearing, usually that parent 
is female.  When someone must care for the children, it is almost always a woman 
who does it, without her work being viewed in terms of money.”181 
Congress essentially rehearsed the observations of MacKinnon and Siegel in its 
enactment of the FMLA,182 and the conclusion of MacKinnon and Siegel is no 
different than the Labor and Human Resources Committee’s statement that 
‘“mothers’ employment is often critical in keeping their families above the poverty 
line.”183  Moreover, Congress, as a matter of social context, implicitly recognized the 
urgency of MacKinnon’s observations by finding that “the number of single-parent 
households and two-parent households in which the single parent or both parents 
work is increasing significantly.”184  
Abortion restrictions have adverse economic consequences that exacerbate the 
preexisting economic disparity between women and men.  In addition, Congress, 
consistent with Muller, in enacting the FMLA and PDA, has treated women’s 
reproductive role from an economic perspective as a matter of social context.185  
Thus, abortion restrictions may be examined from an economic perspective and 
treated as labor legislation.  However, Muller requires labor legislation for women to 
be remedial in order to  “secure a real equality of right.”186  As abortion restrictions 
are economically punitive, and not remedial, they abridge the liberty to contract and 
are unlawful class legislation in violation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.187 
B.  The Adkins-Yick Wo Framework 
The Supreme Court, consistent with a textualist interpretation of Section One of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, held that women’s liberty to contract is formally equal 
                                                                
180MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 1312. 
181MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 1313. 
182See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1)-(2), (5) (1993). 
183S. REP. 103-3, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8. 
18429 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1).  See also S. REP. 103-3, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8 (finding as of 
1993, the date of Congress’ enactment of the FMLA, that 74 percent of women between the 
ages of 25 and 54 were in the labor force, as compared with 19 percent in 1900, and that by 
1995, two-thirds of women with pre-school children and three-quarters of the women with 
school-age children will be in the labor force.). 
185The FMLA and PDA were routed through the Labor Committees of the House and 
Senate. 
186Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908). 
187Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 40 (1915) (holding that “[t]he purpose of an act must 
be found in its natural operation and effect”). 
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to men’s liberty to contract, and women’s “rights in these respects can no more be 
infringed than the equal rights of their brothers.”188   
In addition, Yick Wo proscribes “the play and action of purely personal and 
arbitrary power.”189  Hence, Yick Wo permits a broader interpretation of Adkins to 
encompass the proposition that women may not be subjected to restrictions upon 
their liberty to contract, which are justified on the basis of a physiological 
distinction, although in actuality labor legislation, and cannot physiologically be 
imposed on men under similar circumstances, when physiology is not a valid basis 
for distinction.190  Such restrictions are arbitrarily imposed as was the disparate 
administration of the ordinance in Yick Wo.191  If women and men are assumed to be 
under like circumstances,192 and abortion restrictions are considered labor legislation, 
as consistent with an originalist conception of Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the economically arbitrary nature of abortion restrictions and the 
manner in which they economically injure women permit a conclusion that abortion 
restrictions are unlawful class legislation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, 
as interpreted by Adkins and Yick Wo. 
C.  Abortion Restrictions Violate the Right to Follow Any of the Common 
Occupations 
Yick Wo devised a framework for determining whether a certain state action 
violates the right to follow any of the common occupations: if the state has acted 
arbitrarily in denying some persons the right “to carry on, in the accustomed manner, 
their harmless and useful occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood,” but not 
other persons under like circumstances, the state action violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment.193  Identical to the argument that abortion restrictions violate Adkins if 
women and men are under like circumstances, abortion restrictions, which are 
economic legislation and punitive to women only, are an arbitrary exercise of 
                                                                
188Muller, 208 U.S. at 418; Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 554 (1923) 
(holding that women “are legally as capable of contracting for themselves as men.”).  See also 
id. at 553 (accordingly rejecting the contention that women “may be subjected to restrictions 
upon their liberty to contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case of men under 
similar circumstances”). 
189Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
190See also Truax, 239 U.S. at 40 (stating that “[t]he purpose of an act must be found in its 
natural operation and effect”). 
191See also Barbier, 113 U.S. at 31 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment “undoubtedly 
intended . . . that no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the 
same calling or condition”). 
192This assumption may be justified as a matter of social context as established by the 
FMLA, but originating in Adkins and the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.  This 
social context is the congressional recognition of the revolutionary rise of the number of 
women in the labor force, and their economic requirements as compounded by the economic 
burdens of the maternal role, often and increasingly in single-parent households.  Hence, 
women may be seen as having the same economic needs as men, for example, as the primary 
providers for their families such that from an economic perspective, women and men are 
under like circumstances. 
193See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74. 
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legislative power.  They moreover inhibit women’s ability to participate in the labor 
force, such participation being increasingly critical to their livelihood.  Abortion 
restrictions, therefore, violate the right to follow any of the common occupations. 
1.  The Fourteenth Amendment and the Disparate Impact Proof Construct 
The disparate impact proof construct presented in the preceding section, a proof 
construct that is ultimately rooted in the Maltzian notion of “limited absolute 
equality,”194 and reflected in Lochnerian jurisprudence, obviates the requirement of a 
demonstration of purposeful discrimination, the trademark of the modern equal 
protection doctrine and embodied in Geduldig and Personnel Administrator v. 
Feeney.195  The Lochnerian Fourteenth Amendment proscribed state action 
redistributing wealth, i.e., class legislation.196  Therefore, the Court, in determining 
whether a given state action constituted economic discrimination against some and in 
favor of others, used the obvious and sensible proof construct of an economic 
disparate impact.  In light of the Lochnerian Supreme Court’s focus on economics 
and anti-redistributivism, it never considered the requirement of purposeful 
discrimination that is currently required by the Equal Protection Clause.  Purposeful 
discrimination might govern claims of caste legislation, a second theory of 
impermissible classification also rooted in the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.197  But for claims of redistributive class legislation, the 
economic impact standard would seem to apply whether brought, as in this thought 
experiment, under the Privileges or Immunities Clause or under the modern Equal 
Protection Clause. 
2.  Originalism and the Continued Constitutionality of the New Deal 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Home Building & Loan Association v. 
Blaisdell198 and West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish199 signified the end of the 
Lochner regime and the demise of class legislation theory.  The “familiar story,” as 
recounted by Professor Rosen, is that “the economic reality of the Depression had 
dislodged the nineteenth-century assumptions about the equal bargaining power of 
labor and capital in the common occupations of life.”200 
                                                                
194See Maltz, supra note 19, at 224. 
195442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
196See, e.g., Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32. 
197See Rosen, supra note 10, at 1266.  Charles Sumner defined “caste” as “the principle of 
separation on the ground of hereditary inferiority.”  See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 
(1872) (statement of Rep. Sumner). 
198290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
199300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining a Washington minimum wages statute for women and 
distinguishing Adkins). 
200Jeffrey Rosen, Class Legislation, Public Choice, and the Structural Constitution, 21 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 189 (1997) (arguing that in Blaisdell, “the progressives . . . 
were able to present a barrage of economic facts to argue that a Minnesota debtor relief statute 
was not a form of class legislation benefiting debtors and burdening creditors, but was instead, 
as the Court held, a ‘reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the 
good of all depends.’”  See also Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity 
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XI.  ACCOUNTING FOR THE DEMISE OF LOCHNERISM AND THE NEW DEAL 
The Fourteenth Amendment, in its original context, was designed to secure 
“limited absolute equality” for civil rights,201 i.e., that “all men, whatever their 
condition or attributes, were entitled to a certain minimum level of rights.”202  This 
textual context is embodied by Lochner and its vision of radically limited 
government power animated by classical economics.203  A translation, especially of 
economic rights, must account for the collapse of classical economic theory in light 
of marginalist and progressive critiques after the turn of the century,204 and 
subsequent rise of progressive economics.205  
The argument that abortion restrictions are unlawful class legislation does not 
require a selection of an underlying premise of classical economics or of progressive 
economics, the precise constitutional violation is of the Maltzian notion of “limited 
absolute equality.”  Specifically, an invalidation of abortion restrictions is simply an 
abolishment of a state’s conferral of an arbitrary economic disadvantage on women 
and is thus required by either economic approach.  An examination of abortion 
restrictions in light of the West Coast Hotel Court’s overturning of Adkins will 
clarify this claim. 
The West Coast Hotel Court rehearsed its earlier recognition in Muller that “the 
performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for 
subsistence.”206  The Court also reaffirmed the Muller Court’s determination that 
men and women are not under like circumstances and authorization of constitutional 
protective legislation for women.207   
                                                          
and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 457-58 (1995) (discussing the demise of the wage fund 
theory). 
201Rosen, supra note 10, at 1242 (citing Earl Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: 
Republican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 
221, 224 (1987)).  See also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The 
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997); Michael 
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) 
(agreeing with Earl Maltz). 
202Maltz, supra note 19, at 224.  As seen supra, a textual basis exists for extending 
“limited absolute equality” to women.  
203Rosen, supra note 10, at 1248. 
204Rosen, supra note 10, at 1248.  See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. at 45, 75 (1905) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that Lochner was “decided upon an economic theory which a 
large part of the country does not entertain). 
205See Rosen, supra note 10, at 1248-49 (but defining the problem of Lochnerism more 
narrowly, as a judicial failure to defer in the face of contestability). 
206West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 394 (1937) (citing Muller, 208 U.S. at 
421). 
207See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 395 (and holding that there is that in her disposition 
and habits of life which will operate against a full assertion of those [contractual] rights.  She 
will still be where some legislation to protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of 
right.’  Hence she was ‘properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her 
protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men, and could 
not be sustained.’). 
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The West Coast Hotel Court also considered the Depression and its effects on the 
health and well-being of exploited laborers.208  This consideration, dethroning 
Lochner in its approval of economically remedial action, casts additional doubt on 
the constitutionality of abortion restrictions, because this subscription to progressive 
economic theory a fortiori forbids state action, like abortion restrictions, that 
exacerbates the exploitation of women, who are not only exploited workers 
subsisting in the Depression, but who also face the additional economic burden of 
the reproductive role and still require some protective legislation to secure a real 
equality of right.209 
Thus, a right to be free from abortion restrictions is not grounded in any 
particular economics, but rather in “limited absolute equality.”210  The variation is 
that Congress may interpret the notion of “limited absolute equality” pursuant to its 
interpretive powers under Section Five.  Abortion restrictions may be seen as invalid 
class legislation insofar as they arbitrarily relegate women to a lower economic 
status.  Therefore, if the argument is reliant upon the Maltzian notion, then it is 
necessarily consistent with the progressive economics of the New Deal. 
XII.  MULLER, HOLDEN AND THE “NEW” DEAL 
A.  West Coast Hotel 
West Coast Hotel does not nullify the liberty to contract; nor does the suggested 
“resurrection” of the liberty to contract overturn the post-New Deal administrative 
state.  Rather, West Coast Hotel assailed the liberty to contract’s importance.  It 
expanded the realm of Muller so as to increase the importance and usage of the 
police powers in response to the economic reality of the Depression.  West Coast 
Hotel accordingly consigned the liberty to contract to a dominion where its 
jurisdiction is limited to an enforcement of the requirements of “limited absolute 
equality,” as interpreted by Congress pursuant to Section Five.211  In addition, West 
Coast Hotel recognized that the exploitation and plight of laborers during the 
Depression was akin to the exploitation and plight of the Holden miners such that the 
Holden exception swallowed the Lochner rule. 
The Court in West Coast Hotel revisited Adkins and the constitutionality of a 
minimum wages statute for women.212  The Court rehearsed the premise in Muller 
that women were economically burdened by their reproductive role and determined 
that women and men were not under like circumstances such that “some legislation 
                                                                
208See id. at 399 (holding that there is an additional and compelling consideration which 
recent economic experience has brought into a strong light. The exploitation of a class of 
workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus 
relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health 
and well being, but casts a direct burden for their support upon the community.) 
209Id. at 395; Muller, 208 U.S. at 422. 
210Insofar as classical economics is wedded to the Maltzian notion, the right to be free 
from abortion restriction premises classical economics. 
211One of these requirements, if not the only one is a prohibition of foundational, 
economically punitive legislation such as abortion restrictions. 
212West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 386. 
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to protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of right.”213  The West Coast 
Hotel Court, abandoning Adkins, characterized the wages law as like “hundreds of 
so-called police laws that have been upheld”214 and ruled that no distinction between 
a maximum hours law and a minimum wages law exists.215  This permitted 
invocation of the police powers did not constitute a negation of the liberty to 
contract; it merely granted states more power to act in order to secure a real equality 
of right for women. 
The West Coast Hotel Court’s sustainment of the wages law was predicated on 
the Great Depression and the exploited workers left defenseless against the denial of 
a living wage, and thus imperiled their health and well-being.216  This predicate, 
justifying state intervention, is precisely analogous to Holden, where the Court held 
that the state may act where “public health demands that one party to a contract be 
protected against himself.”217  In both West Coast Hotel and Holden, the Court 
emphasized that the plight of exploited workers, whose health was compromised, 
implicated the interest of the state.218  West Coast Hotel then, adjudicated in the 
midst of the Great Depression, only confirms the increasing significance and 
prescience of Felix Frankfurter’s view in 1917 that what appeared to the Holden 
Court as  
a specific, and apparently, exceptional instance-the poisoning of the 
human system through long hours of labor in mines, and the implications 
of this evil to the general welfare-is now disclosed to be of far wider and 
deeper application.  It is now demonstrable that the considerations that 
were patent to miners in 1898 are to-day operative . . . throughout the 
industrial system.219   
West Coast Hotel and the New Deal then do not represent a nullification of the 
liberty to contract, but only its increasing irrelevancy in the Depression, an 
irrelevancy borne by the Depression where economic despondency and imperiled 
health touched the multitudes, not simply miners in Utah.  As conditions for workers 
increasingly deteriorated, the opportunity for state intervention increased, and the 
                                                                
213Id. at 394-95 (citing Muller, 208 U.S. at 421-22). 
214Id. at 397 (citing Adkins, 261 U.S. at 570 (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
215See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 398 (rhetorically asking that “if the protection of 
women is a legitimate end of the exercise of state power, how can it be said that the 
requirement of the payment of a minimum wage fairly fixed in order to meet the very 
necessities of existence is not an admissible means to that end”). 
216Id. at 399. 
217Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898).  See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 394 
(rehearsing Holden). 
218See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 399-400; Holden, 169 U.S. at 396-97. 
219Felix Frankfurter, et al. for defendant in error, reproduced in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 
U.S. 426, 431-33 (1917).  See also Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: 
Fidelity And Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 460 (1995) (arguing that “the Court points to the 
facts learned during the recent Depression, to facts the court can take ‘judicial notice’ of, to 
facts that reveal the public interest affected by this legislation, which under traditional police 
power notions preserves the state power to regulate”). 
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reign of the contract right’s importance ended.  But as its existence in 1898 was 
unchallenged, its existence in 1937 and beyond must too remain unchallenged. 
B.  The FMLA: Extending Muller to Men 
Congress, in enacting the FMLA and consistent with its interpretive powers 
pursuant to Section Five, not only affirmed Muller, but applied its social logic to 
men.  Congress found that “employment standards that apply to one gender only 
have serious potential for encouraging employers to discriminate against employees 
and applicants for employment who are of that gender.”220  In doing so, Congress did 
not proscribe such standards and recognized the continued constitutional validity of 
Muller. 
With Muller as a foundation, Congress, in its enactment of the FMLA, 
understood that men are also economically burdened by women’s reproductive role 
and accordingly placed men under the umbrella of Muller.221  Specifically, Congress 
found that “the lack of employment policies to accommodate working parents can 
force individuals to choose between job security and parenting.”222  Congress 
accordingly entitled men qua employees “to take reasonable leave . . . for the birth or 
adoption of a child, and for the care of a child . . . who has a serious health 
condition.”223 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourteenth Amendment was originally intended to forbid the states from 
playing a role in the economy, i.e., from enacting economic effects unless the 
intervention was consistent with the police powers.  This principle was the hallmark 
of Lochner.  Separately, Congress has developed a greater understanding of women’s 
economic role and has recognized that a woman’s maternal role constitutes a 
substantial economic burden.  Abortion restrictions too constitute an economic 
burden, and Congress is permitted to alleviate this burden through Section Five 
legislation; similarly, the Court could invalidate abortion restrictions on this ground. 
After viability, fetal rights do appear to compete with women’s constitutional 
economic rights.  As there is no obvious or coherent constitutional notion of when 
life begins, the claim in this article must be limited to Casey’s confinement of a 
women’s right to choose to the pre-viability stage of pregnancy. 
EPILOGUE: SAENZ V. ROE224 
The Supreme Court recently invalidated a California welfare statute that limited 
maximum welfare benefits available to newly arrived residents.225  The Court held 
                                                                
22029 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(6) (1994). 
221See Muller, 208 U.S. at 422 (holding that “[s]he will still be where some legislation to 
protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of right.”) 
22229 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(3) (1994). 
22329 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (1998). 
224119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999). 
225See Saenz v. Roe, 119 S.Ct. 1518 (1999).  The California statutory scheme linked the 
amount payable to a family residing in California for less than 12 months to the amount 
payable by the State of the family’s prior residence.  Id. at 1521. 
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that the statute violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a holding that, as Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent, “breathes new life 
into the previously dormant Privileges or Immunities Clause . . . a Clause relied upon 
by this court in only one other decision . . . . ”226  Thus, Saenz represents at least the 
potential for a major turning point in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 
The attractiveness of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is that it restores the 
historical foundation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and demands an analytical rigor 
that the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause do not, such that a greater 
sense of definiteness can be obtained.227  However, when the Court adjudicates on 
the basis of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and does not do so with the 
appropriate rigor, the Court cannot achieve its goal of historical consistency and 
clarity and thus vitiates the entire allure and objective of originalism.  Saenz v. Roe 
is, unfortunately, an example of adjudication without rigor. 
The Court in Saenz participates in an exercise very similar to the thought 
experiment undertaken in this article.  The Court attempts to link a state welfare 
benefit to the right to travel, a privilege or immunity of national citizenship.228  
Similarly, we attempt to link the modern abortion right to two privileges or 
immunities of national citizenship, the liberty to contract and the liberty to engage in 
the common occupations.229   
However, while we use Section Five legislation to treat abortion restrictions as 
economic legislation, the Saenz majority merely states that a United States citizen 
may become a citizen of any state, with the same rights of the citizens of that state, 
and that “the right to travel embraces the citizen’s right to be treated equally in her 
new state of residence . . . .”230  The Court’s notion of “right to be treated equally” is 
ill-defined, and as it subsumes a state welfare benefit into the category of protected 
privileges or immunities under the auspices of the right to travel, the Court’s notion 
of “equally” is painted at an abstraction from the notion of limited absolute equality 
animating the Fourteenth Amendment.231  Similarly, Justice Thomas, also dissenting, 
correctly states that “at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, people 
understood that ‘privileges or immunities of citizens’ were fundamental rights, rather 
than every public benefit established by positive law.”232  But to protect a welfare 
benefit as a privilege or immunity, a link must be supplied through some 
constitutionally proper source or rigorous translation.  In Saenz, the Court failed to 
provide such a link or translation. 
                                                                
226Id. at 1530 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (citing Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935) 
and Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) (overrruling Colgate). 
227See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
228See Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1526 (asserting that the California law implicates the “third 
aspect of the right to travel - the right of the newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and 
immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same state”). 
229One difference worth noting is that the right to travel, at least some form of it, is 
mentioned in both the majority and dissenting opinions of the Slaughter-House Cases, while 
this article assumes that the majority opinion is wrong. 
230See Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1526, 1527. 
231See Rosen, supra note 10, at 1242. 
232See Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1538 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Thus for the California welfare law to violate the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, it must be linked in the constitutional sense to the right to travel.233  
Specifically, the right to travel must function as an umbrella right, where a 
constitutional right to welfare can exist.  A link can arise through the enactment of 
Section Five legislation, facially interpretive of the privileges or immunities or of 
constitutionally significant social context.  The other side of this coin is that the 
Supreme Court too has a role in interpreting social context, although a role 
accompanied by murky boundaries.  Justice Thomas is correct to view the Saenz 
decision with scepticism, because of the Court’s unpersuasive linking of a state 
welfare benefit with the right to travel.  In short, the majority’s concern for “the right 
to be treated equally” sounds like the actual and independent ground for the welfare 
law’s constitutional invalidity, though not a privilege or immunity, nor animating the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.234 
The Court must, as Justice Thomas notes, ascertain the historical underpinnings 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and place in constitutional jurisprudence.235  
The Court did not do so and failed to understand or even to identify its precise role as 
interpreter of the privileges or immunities.  Thus, the Saenz decision must be 
regarded as rash and taken without the proper cogitation needed on such a delicate 
issue.236  The only connection between the welfare law and the right to travel so as to 
constitutionalize the welfare law is the Court’s word, although if the Court has not 
escaped the bounds of its judicial role, the Court’s word is probably sufficient. 
 
                                                                
233See also Akhil Reed Amar, Lost Clause The New Republic, June 14, 1999 at 15 
(arguing that the “bigger question” for the Saenz Court was “whether maintaining somebody’s 
welfare payments at a preexisting level for a year is really a ‘penalty’ on interstate 
movement.”). 
234See Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1527.  The “right to be treated equally” resembles modern 
Equal Protection Doctrine in its governance of all state action, not the fundamental right-
driven Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
235Id. at 1538 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
236See also Amar, supra note 231, at 16 (wondering, with regard to the issue of general 
judicial role, whether “will the Court in future cases insist on claiming all this territory for 
itself, or will it prove more willing to share authority with Congress. . . [i]n these respects, 
Saenz raises as many questions as it answers”). 
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